John Hendy KC in the Lords: the Employment Rights Bill (Video)

“My Lords, I get the impression that there is a bit of a misunderstanding around the nature of employment tribunals. I spent the first half of a long career at the Bar doing employment tribunal cases, many of them unfair dismissal cases. In fact, the first case I ever did—pro bono, by the way—was an unfair dismissal case in 1972, under what was then the very new unfair dismissal legislation. Unfair dismissal cases are difficult for employees to win. Most cases that go to a full hearing result in the employer being vindicated.

I want to make two points. The first is that employment tribunals now have robust procedures for weeding out vexatious cases; such cases never go to a full hearing. Secondly, I remind your Lordships of the law on unfair dismissal in Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The test is in two parts. First, the employer must demonstrate that the reason for the dismissal is capability, qualifications, conduct or redundancy or the fact that the employment is in breach of some enactment. Once the employer has shown that that is the reason, the test for the tribunal—I shall read it out—is whether the dismissal is fair, which,

“depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee”.

So all the factors that one would expect to have to be taken into consideration are taken into consideration.

The tribunal then has to determine that,

“in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case”.

The Court of Appeal has added yet another burden. When the tribunal decides whether the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably, it is not about what it considers was reasonable or unreasonable; it is about whether it considers that the dismissal fell within the band of responses of reasonable employers. It is at two stages removed. It is not like an ordinary negligence case where the court decides whether an employer was reasonable or not reasonable in putting a guard on the machine. It must decide. Even if it thinks that the decision was unreasonable, if it finds that, nevertheless, reasonable employers would say that it might be possible that the reason was fair, that would be legitimate.”

“The noble Lord referred to the likelihood of cases succeeding if they got as far as the tribunal. Does he accept that the vast majority of cases that are initiated never get as far as a tribunal because there is a huge incentive in the system for employers to settle? The costs of taking a case right the way through are huge—not just in the monetary cost of employing clever employment lawyers but, in particular, in the diversion of management effort within the organisation. I have seen this in large organisations, where swathes of the management team can be tied up for long periods of time. Employers cannot afford that in the broadest sense. If you put that in the context of smaller organisations, they absolutely cannot cope with it.

Whatever happens at the tribunal and whatever the law says, the mere initiation of an action nearly always results in an economic decision, made by the employer, to settle. That is one of the most difficult aspects and is why extending that into the early period of employment causes so many worries for employers.”

“I absolutely agree that most cases never get to a full hearing; only a tiny minority ever do. The noble Baroness is right that many cases settle, of course. Many are conciliated, because there is now compulsory conciliation by ACAS, but many are withdrawn by the employee. You have to visualise it, as I am sure the noble Baroness does: most employees bringing an unfair dismissal claim are completely unrepresented. They are on their own, so all the expense, research and preparation that have to be done must be done by them personally. That is a huge disincentive. Many claims—tens of thousands of them—are simply not brought because it is not worth the employees’ while to do it.”

I will say one last thing before I sit down. The argument that the noble Lords and noble Baronesses opposite have put forward is all about what they perceive to be the consequences of this matter, which my noble friend Lord Monks just addressed. But nobody can seriously advance the case that employers should have the right to dismiss anybody unfairly and without recourse to the law.”

“Does the noble Lord accept that these are not simply arguments that people around this Chamber are putting forward but matters that are in the Bill’s impact assessment? It is the Government’s own statement that the Bill will have these impacts. It is not being made up by any of us: the Government accept that this will be the impact.”

“That may very well be, but it still does not remove the fundamental point: what is being proposed is a category of worker who can be dismissed unfairly for the most extreme reasons without resort to any justice.”

Lord Hendy Calls for Tougher Remedies where Employers Act Unlawfully in Collective Redundancies – Employment Rights Bill at House of Lords Committee Stage (3rd June 2025)

Transcript:

“My Lords, Amendment 143 is intended to provide a tougher remedy for breach of the obligation, which is a very modest one, to consult in cases of collective redundancy. At present, the Toggle showing location ofColumn 693remedy is an award of loss of earnings capped at a maximum of 90 days, which the Bill proposes to increase to 180 days. My amendment is not concerned with that. It proposes judicial intervention to prevent the breach, or at least to restore the position prior to the breach. So, where a declaration has been made by an employment tribunal, the union should be entitled to go to the High Court to obtain an order to enforce that declaration. The employment tribunal does not itself have the jurisdiction to make such an order; indeed, it does not have the power to enforce its own orders. That is why it is necessary for workers to issue further proceedings in the county court if their employer fails to pay a tribunal award.

The amendment makes it clear that any dismissal which should have been subject to Section 188 of the 1992 Act but was not will be void and of no effect, so the obligation to continue to pay wages and to honour the other incidents of employment will continue until the employer has fulfilled its legal duty. I should add, in case any of your Lordships doubt it, that the High Court does indeed have the power to restrain dismissal and declare a purported dismissal void and of no effect. The court has often done so where the dismissal was unlawful because, in breach of contract, the power is still more apposite where the unlawfulness is breach of a statutory duty.

Finally, the amendment puts beyond doubt that the normal consequences of non-compliance with an order of the High Court will apply: that the company and any officer personally frustrating the order may be subject to proceedings for contempt of court, including fine, sequestration and, in the most egregious cases, imprisonment.

The rationale for my amendment is obvious. We are talking about a situation in which an employer has broken or proposes to break the law by throwing a significant number of people out of work without properly consulting on measures which might have avoided that situation. A very limited financial penalty is plainly not enough to dissuade lawbreakers, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, recognised. What is required is not just a more dissuasive remedy but one which prevents the unlawful situation, or at least restores the situation to lawfulness, so far as it can be restored. Only the High Court has the power to do that.

There is another reason: the need to comply with international law which the UK has voluntarily ratified. Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organization will need more detailed consideration in later amendments, but for current purposes it is enough to note that, together, they require member states—not just ratifying states—to respect and protect freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively. Compliance with international law is the eighth of Lord Bingham’s principles of the rule of law, and the importance of compliance with international law was emphasised by the Attorney-General in a speech to the Royal United Services Institute last week. It matters not whether the provision in question relates to trade, the environment, security, labour or any other matter, and compliance is not restricted to the black letter of the treaty but also required of the decisions of the bodies appointed by the treaty to supervise compliance with it.Toggle showing location ofColumn 694

One such constitutional body of the ILO is the tripartite Committee on Freedom of Association, which consists of representatives of government, employers and workers. On 8 November 2023, it published its decision on a complaint brought against the United Kingdom by Nautilus International, the RMT, the TUC and a number of international trade union federations. This arose out of the P&O Ferries scandal mentioned earlier this evening. At 7 am on St Patrick’s Day 2022, the employer summarily dismissed 786 seafarers, with security guards escorting them from the ships past waiting coachloads of agency staff from third-world, cheap-labour countries recruited to replace them.

The report says that the committee notes the complainants’ indication that

“while breaches of the UK law entitle claims to be made in an employment tribunal, such claims are subject to statutorily fixed (and very modest) maxima; for this reason, the company was able to quantify with precision what the cost of the dismissals would be and to assess how long it would be before that cost could be recouped from future profits generated by the poverty wages and diminished terms and conditions of the new crews. The complainants thus allege that the dismissal of 786 seafarers to replace them with non-unionized agency workers constitutes an act of anti-union discrimination. The complainants further allege that the existing legislation is insufficient to deter anti-union discrimination as in practice, employers can, on condition that they pay the compensation prescribed by the law for cases of unfair dismissals, dismiss any worker for being a trade union member with better terms and conditions under a collective agreement. The Committee recalls in this respect that protection against acts of anti-union discrimination would appear to be inadequate if an employer can resort to subcontracting as a means of evading in practice the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining … The Committee considers that it would not appear that sufficient protection against acts of anti-union discrimination, as set out in Convention No. 98, is granted by legislation in cases where employers can in practice, on condition that they pay the compensation prescribed by law for cases of unjustified dismissal, dismiss any worker, if the true reason is the worker’s trade union membership or activities … The Committee recalls that the Government must ensure an adequate and efficient system of protection against acts of anti-union discrimination, which should include sufficiently dissuasive sanctions and prompt means of redress, emphasizing reinstatement as an effective means of redress … Furthermore, the compensation should be adequate, taking into account both the damage incurred and the need to prevent the repetition of such situations in the future … The Committee therefore requests the Government to ensure an adequate and efficient system of protection against acts of anti-union discrimination, which should include sufficiently dissuasive sanctions and prompt means of redress, emphasizing reinstatement as an effective means of redress”.

Of course, there the committee considered that the collective dismissals were in order to avoid long-standing collective agreements which provided for notice of dismissal and consultation over proposed redundancies, which it regarded as anti-union discrimination. That situation will not occur in every collective redundancy—of course that is the case—but it will be true in many, though not all, collective redundancy situations. I should add that what we are looking at here are really bad employers. The remedy that I am proposing will not be used against good employers that do their best to deal with the situation.

The tribunal remedies which the committee considered very modest were not just for failure to consult over collective dismissal but included compensation for unfair dismissal. Here we are considering the even more modest, statutorily capped compensation for failure to consult. As the committee held, what is needed areToggle showing location ofColumn 695

“sufficiently dissuasive sanctions and prompt means of redress, emphasising reinstatement as an effective means of redress”.

Only an injunction will achieve that outcome. That would have stopped P&O Ferries in its tracks.

I say to my noble friend the Minister that I can see no reason not to add this remedy to those available to restrain such unlawful activity. While the increase in maximum award, from 90 to 180 days—as the tribunal has to assess compensation as what is just and equitable up to that cap—is not sufficient in itself, since injunctions are available for breach of contract, why are they not for breach of statute as well? I beg to move.”

Workers Left Behind Without Sector-Wide Bargaining in the Employment Rights Bill – Lord John Hendy speaks in the Lords Committee Stage

Transcript:

“My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 152 to 179, which are intended not to undermine but to improve the SSSNB.

First, I will say a word about collective bargaining relevant to these amendments and to later amendments dealing with that subject. The term was coined by Beatrice Webb in 1891. It means negotiations between one or several trade unions on the one side and one or more employers or employers’ associations on the other, with a view to agreeing rates of remuneration and other terms and conditions of employment for a defined group of workers. The term is defined in Section 178 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, which sets out various matters which may form the basis of such negotiations—not just pay, terms and conditions, but including dismissals, allocation of work, union facilities, dispute resolution machinery, and so on. The International Labour Organization—ILO—has a similar, but less detailed, definition in Convention 154.

Collective bargaining may be on a sector-wide basis across a particular industry or it may be confined to a particular enterprise. Where there are sectoral agreements setting minimum terms, they are usually improved upon by enterprise agreements with individual employers in the sector. The UK was the first country to establish widespread collective bargaining coverage. By 1948, the then Prime Minister could say in a broadcast to the nation that:

“We have built up in this country a system of collective bargaining without parallel in the world”.That coverage was built upon two pillars: the statutory wages councils introduced by Winston Churchill in the Trade Boards Act 1909, latterly regulated by the Wages Council Act 1979, and the voluntary joint national councils, or Whitley councils, pursuant to the reports of the Reconstruction Committee after the First World War by JH Whitley. Governments of all persuasions were committed to the promotion of collective bargaining, particularly because of its very positive effect on productivity in both world wars. In consequence, collective agreement coverage of UK workers was in excess of 80% between 1945 and 1980.

Significantly, the proportion of workers covered by only an enterprise-level collective agreement was almost insignificant and had grown to only 9% by the late 1970s. The dismantling of sectoral collective bargaining since 1980 has produced a steady downward curve in the coverage, which was not halted by the introduction of the recognition machinery for enterprise-level bargaining in 2000. The percentage of workers whose terms are negotiated now is likely to be around 25%. The remaining three-quarters must take what they are offered.

The staggering decline from over 80% coverage to 25% has had a devastating effect on workers. The stagnation in the real value of wages and the meteoric rise in zero-hours contracts and job insecurity can be attributed, at least in part, to that dramatic decline. To achieve the growth and improvement in living standards rightly sought by the Government necessitates restoration of extensive collective bargaining coverage.

There are considerable benefits to that. A few years ago, the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out that:

“The right to bargain collectively with an employer enhances the human dignity, liberty and autonomy of workers by giving them the opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules and thereby gain some control over a major aspect of their lives, namely their work. Collective bargaining is not simply an instrument for pursuing external ends … rather [it] is intrinsically valuable as an experience in self-government … Collective bargaining permits workers to achieve a form of workplace democracy and to ensure the rule of law in the workplace”.

It has also been said that collective bargaining

“is the mode in which employees participate in setting the terms and conditions of employment, rather than simply accepting what their employer chooses to give them”.

Workers enjoy the benefits of increased wages and improved minimum terms and conditions. Trade unions can negotiate on a sector-wide stage without diminishing their ability to negotiate better terms locally.

The benefits of sectoral collective bargaining extend to employers too. Sectoral collective bargaining prevents undercutting and steadies labour costs. Employers in the same sector must compete instead in investment, innovation, efficiency and productivity—the fields of competition which foster growth. Employers, especially SMEs and micro employers, benefit from not having to research or negotiate wages with their workers. Instead, the minimum terms and conditions for their sector are contained in the sectoral agreement.

Employers profit from the increase in consumer demand, consequent on increased earnings generally. Governments enjoy increased tax from higher earnings and the diminished need to fund social security payments to subsidise low wages. Sectoral collective bargaining has proved to reduce inequality, not just between high and low earners but between women and men, and to reduce the pay gap suffered by disabled and ethnic-minority workers.

There is much research from academic institutions to support these conclusions, as well as from the ILO, OECD and IMF. In 2024, the European Union went so far as to adopt a directive requiring member states that have less than an 80% coverage of collective agreements to put in place an action plan to achieve such coverage.

A letter in last week’s Financial Times pointed out that Sweden—notwithstanding its conversion over the last 30 years from neosocialism to neoliberalism—preserved, at the insistence of employers and unions, the very extensive sectoral collective bargaining that characterises Nordic industrial relations.

Collective bargaining, and in particular sectoral collective bargaining, is not just desirable in itself; international law requires the UK to promote and encourage it. That is a subject I will return to in the next group.

It is unclear why the Bill does not stipulate the creation of collective bargaining bodies. The UK’s long and successful experience of statutory wages councils and voluntary joint national councils provides fine precedents. There are many other such precedents as well.

With that introduction, I turn to the proposition that the SSSNB is not the collective bargaining forum it should be, and which many unfamiliar with the detail of the Bill assumed it would be. To save time, I will also refer to the adult social care negotiating body—I wish the Government had chosen easier acronyms—since the Bill’s proposals and the arguments about them are virtually identical.

The relevant features are these. First, the Bill expressly states that nothing in the SSSNB is to be regarded as collective bargaining as defined by Section 178 of 1992 Act, and that any agreements reached are not to be regarded as collective agreements. The ASCNB is slightly different, in that the relevant Minister is given power to exclude the application of Section 178.

Secondly, the Bill defines a negotiating body, but its functions do not include negotiation. The parties have no power to decide for themselves the matters they wish to discuss and are confined to the four subjects permitted to each by the Bill, plus any additions conferred by the Minister. The very limited subjects so far permitted exclude, for example, work organisation, diversity and inclusion, eradication of pay gaps, health and safety, deployment of new technology, formulation of a dispute resolution procedure and the legal status of workers in the sector.

Thirdly, the Bill gives the Minister power to make regulations as to the nature of the consideration the negotiating body must give to the authorised subjects, with power to direct specific factors the body must take into consideration and any conditions that must be met in reaching agreement. Matters can be discussed by the SSSNB only with the permission, or on the direction, of the Minister, who can also specify matters that may not be discussed.

Fourthly, if the body reaches an agreement, the Minister can override it and require reconsideration, specifying factors that must be taken into account and conditions that must be met to reach a reconsidered agreement acceptable to Minister. Ultimately, the Minister can override agreements of the negotiating body.

Fifthly, if the negotiating body fails to agree, the Minister has the power to assume its functions and impose a settlement, regardless of the wishes of the parties, who may, of course, prefer their own dispute resolution procedure, or conciliation, mediation and arbitration by a third party in whom they have confidence.

Sixthly, terms agreed and approved, or simply dictated, by the Secretary of State will be set for all relevant workers. Consequently, any genuine collective agreement for more favourable terms will be void. Far from promoting collective bargaining, the effect of this provision is to preclude it.

Seventhly, the employers and the unions are unable to decide for themselves the size and composition of the body; that is in the exclusive power of the relevant Minister, who will determine how members may be appointed to each body, including the chairperson and third parties, who must not represent employers or unions in the sector. They will have voting rights, if the Minister chooses, in the case of the ASCNB, but not in the case of the SSSNB. Employers and unions may not choose their own chair and, in the case of the SSSNB, must not select one of their representatives as chair, thus precluding the usual arrangement of alternating the chair between the two sides.

Eighthly and finally, the Bill defines a social care worker as those employed, thus excluding the many self-employed.

These features are incompatible with free collective bargaining under any definition, and my amendments intend to do the following. It will take me a moment to go through them. Amendment 152 would allow the SSSNB to collectively bargain on any of the matters specified in Section 178 of the 1992 Act. Amendment 173 would allow agreement of the SSSNB to constitute collective agreement within the meaning of that section. Amendments 153, 160, 162, 167 and 170 all provide for inclusion of the self-employed. Amendment 154 would permit the body to negotiate dispute resolution machinery, grievance and disciplinary procedures and anything else that the employers and unions want to negotiate.

Amendments 155 to 159 would remove the ministerial power to prevent any of the currently permitted matters being discussed. Amendment 161 would remove the requirement for the Minister to authorise discussion on permitted matters. Amendments 163 to 166, 168, 169, 171 and 172 would make the output of the process a minimum floor, thus permitting subsequent or prior agreement for more beneficial terms. Amendment 177 would remove ministerial representatives and confine membership of the body to unions and employers. Amendment 179 would permit the SSSNB to determine its own constitution, allowing intervention by the Minister only if it cannot agree its constitution.

I apologise for taking so long, but I now beg to move.”

Lord Hendy Presents amendment on Sectoral Collective Bargaining- Employment Rights Bill at House of Lords Report Stage (21st July 2025)

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